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INTRODUCTION
The subprime mortgage crisis that began in the United States eventually 
unraveled as the worst global economic crisis – the Great Recession – since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. The literature has described several 
factors to explain the causes of the Great Recession, most prominent being 
the pace of financial deregulations and excessive financial innovations that 
catalyzed an unnatural boom that ended in a crisis (Crotty and Epstein, 
2009). Countries hit the hardest in terms of an upsurge in unemployment 
rates over 2008–10 include Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
and Latvia. A comparison of harmonized unemployment rates for these 
countries shows that Estonia posted the highest increase in the unemploy-
ment rate, which rose from 5.5 percent in 2008 to 16.7 percent in 2010, an 
increase of 203 percentage points. Other countries worst hit by the crisis 
were Iceland (153 percent), Latvia (151 percent) and Ireland (117 percent) 
(OECD, 2018a).
To this end, an important but understated issue worthy of discussion 
concerns the gender impacts of the Great Recession. Crisis theories that 
have described its distributional dynamics do not converge to a united 
whole and predict differential impacts of crises for men and women. One 
theory posits that since women are used as employment buffers – called in 
when demand increases but pushed back when demand shrinks – women’s 
unemployment rates may rise more than that of men’s during recessionary 
phases. Thus, women might experience a greater loss in employment, 
earned income, and overall wealth during recessions (Humphries, 1988 
[2010]). However, an argument running counter to this theory is that 
women’s concentration in female-dominated occupations – which tend to 
be cyclically robust – may shield women’s employment relative to that of 
men’s.
Since there is no definitive theoretical model of  these relations, the 
issue of  the gender impacts of  recessions becomes an empirical question. 
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In this respect, men’s and women’s labor market experiences from the 
Great Recession can be treated as a litmus test. Similar to previous two 
recessions in the US, men’s unemployment rates rose faster than women’s 
during the Great Recession. Due to this phenomenon, these recessions 
have come to be known as “man-cessions” (Wall, 2009). However, as 
I argue in this chapter, this observation can be misleading on many 
accounts. I argue that although men and women showed substantial 
differences in their vulnerabilities to the recession, within-gender dif-
ferences were much more pronounced. Additionally, gender impacts of 
crises derive from differences in men’s and women’s unique, socially and 
culturally drawn positions, job structures, family models and welfare 
systems.
With regard to labeling the Great Recession a “man-cession,” although 
crude comparisons of the data from advanced economies may lead to 
a simplistic conclusion that men fared worse than women – in terms of 
job losses – comparison of intra-country and intra-group heterogeneities 
suggests that the burden of the recession fell on the weaker groups within 
each gender category. Women on the lower rungs of employment and in 
low-income categories, and single mothers, fared disproportionately worse 
than women in high-skilled, high-income categories (Albelda, 2014). 
Additionally, disparities in men’s and women’s responses to second-round 
effects of the recession need to be counted toward overall gender impact 
of the Great Recession. Although, manufacturing and construction sec-
tors took an immediate hit from the recession, in terms of job losses, 
second-round effects – particularly, the ensuing austerity measures in 
many countries in Europe – seem to have shifted the cost of the recession 
back to women.
In this vein, this chapter brings together a comparative strand of 
analyses underlying the distributional dynamics of the Great Recession to 
form a reanalysis of its genderimpacts on labor markets in selected OECD 
countries. It argues that gender regimes shaped by family policies and 
cultural factors can mediate the effects of crises on the economic situation 
of men and women. Additionally, both the family policies and cultural 
factors can help explain why men’s employment recovered faster than that 
of women’s. Paid parental leave systems may have mediated some of the 
distributional dynamics across gender lines due to their implications for 
sexual division of labor.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section lays out 
a brief  description of frameworks helpful in understanding the gender 
impacts of recessions and draws on selected literature to argue that 
simplistic comparisons of indicators from paid employment may be 
misleading. The third section attempts to develop a comparative outlook 
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of the gender impacts of the Great Recession in the context of family 
policies. In the conclusion, I highlight that both the cultural factors and 
family policies can explain differential experiences of men and women in 
crises, across countries.
REVIEW OF FRAMEWORKS AND COMPARATIVE 
LITERATURE
Theoretical Frameworks
This section attempts to bring together various strands of analyses, posited 
in the selected literature, about the frameworks and the distributional 
impact of the Great Recession – and crises in general – on the employment 
situation of men and women.
As noted by Humphries (1988 [2010]), hypotheses that explain women’s 
employment outcomes over crisis periods fall into three main categories:
1.  The “flexible reserve”1 or buffer hypothesis suggests that women are a 
flexible reserve, drawn into the labor market during economic upturns 
and pushed back during economic downturns – that women’s employ-
ment s is procyclical. The theoretical perspective for this prediction 
is based on human capital theory that suggests that relatively lower 
human capital endowments and lower levels of job-specific skills 
may reduce the incentive for firms to hoard female workers during 
economic downturns (Oi, 1962). The buffer hypothesis assumes that 
the discouraged worker effect will dominate in a recession and predicts 
a decline in women’s unemployment and labor force participation 
rates – more discouraged women than men leave the labor market. 
This hypothesis, however, runs into a major problem. Crises may also 
alter firms’ demand for job-specific skills and, in general, influence 
the labor cost/human capital trade-off. From this perspective, if  firms, 
compelled by the recessionary pressures, aggressively cut back their 
labor costs, hoarding female workers would make sense – women’s 
employment should therefore rise more than men’s. However, firms 
may also employ female workers in unstable employment forms or 
areas that require frequent adjustment – for example, temporary and 
part-time jobs. A recession may, therefore, lead to an increase in the 
share of unstable employment; hence, even if  women’s employment 
increases over a downturn, it is crucial to focus on the qualitative 
aspects of such gains – the nature of job stability and employment 
conditions.
50 The political economy of international finance in an age of inequality
2.  According to the substitution hypothesis, during times of economic 
hardship, employers’ quest to cut costs and to increase the flexibility 
of production leads to substitution of female workers for relatively 
more expensive male workers. During a downturn, firms may be 
pressured to convert some of the high-paid stable jobs into low-paid, 
less stable jobs; thus, substitution of female workers for male workers 
may result in deepening of gender differentials in terms of segregation 
and wage gap during a recession. The substitution hypothesis predicts 
a strong added-worker effect for women’s participation in the labor 
force: increased female labor force participation and lower unemploy-
ment rates relative to that of male rates.
3.  Finally, the segmentation hypothesis emphasizes the role of socially 
constructed boundaries in shaping job structures in the labor markets 
– for example, sex-typing of jobs.2 Theoretically, women’s employment 
trends over business cycles will relate more to the trends in sectoral and 
occupational structures than business cycles themselves. The segmen-
tation hypothesis predicts that, in a recession, women’s unemployment 
rates will reduce relative to men’s as women’s employment is relatively 
stable due to its concentration in less cyclically sensitive sectors.
Bettio and Verashchagina (2014) point to yet another idea, that during 
economic crises the group with lower employment protection serves 
as a natural flexible buffer; hence, women, due to their prevalence in 
temporary employment, may be more vulnerable to the combined effects 
of economic downturns and labor market segmentation. If  employ-
ment protection differs among employees, such legislations may reinforce 
disparities in  bargaining power between the “insiders” – tenured, adult, 
skilled workers who have more favorable employment opportunities – and 
the  “outsiders”  – untenured, younger workers who have less favorable 
employment conditions. Women may be perceived as outsiders due to 
their more frequent exits and entries into the labor market and the relative 
unstable nature of their job contracts.
While the buffer hypothesis has popular currency among some analysts 
(Beechey, 1977), its predictions – concerning the “disposable” nature of 
women’s labor in times of economic hardship – have been called into 
question by the experiences of men and women in past crises. For example, 
Humphries’s (1988 [2010]) analysis of women’s employment experiences in 
three post–World War II recessions in the United States (1971, 1975 and 
1982) shows that the employment situation deteriorated less for women 
than for men. Testing for cyclical sensitivity of female employment by run-
ning the regressions of percentage change in women’s employment on the 
percentage change in total employment, Humphries finds that the buffer 
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hypothesis is only supported at the intermediate stage of integration of 
women in each sector and industry division. Women tend to occupy more 
cyclically volatile jobs when their employment penetrates beyond clerical 
tasks. Women’s employment becomes less cyclically volatile when their 
employment occupies a major share in an industry.
Theoretically, the sex-typing of jobs can be rigid and strong in the short 
run; therefore, women’s employment behavior over the cycle is strongly 
influenced by sectoral and occupational patterns of job losses in a reces-
sion. Given that crises tend to have a relatively more distinct sectoral 
impact than occupational (Bettio et al., 2012), sectoral segregation may, to 
some extent, shield women’s employment.
Gender impacts of the crises may also be shaped by the unequal 
position of men and women in relation to productive and reproductive 
spheres, and the gendered structure of welfare systems. Social norms that 
construct expected gender roles, underpin the differences in labor market 
attachments in terms of the nature and types of jobs held by men and 
women (Elson, 1999; Folbre, 2001; Khalil, 2018). Because women are 
disproportionately more represented in temporary and part-time jobs, they 
face higher job insecurity. Although part-time workers may also be covered 
by permanent contracts in some countries, they may still be excluded from 
career accession (Tomlinson, 2006). Women may, therefore, have higher 
turnover rates due to poor job quality (Felstead and Gallie, 2004).
Last but not least, last-in, first-out seniority layoffs, as typical in the 
United States, may also render women more vulnerable to unemployment 
as women’s average job tenure intervals are lower than men’s. If  turnover 
rates are higher for women than for men, women’s employment may 
be expected to undergo greater adjustment than men’s employment in 
response to changes in demand. Houseman and Abraham (1993) estimate 
elasticities – over one, three, and 12-month periods – for male and female 
employment with respect to changes in output for Japan and the United 
States. Their results from the manufacturing sector showed that female 
workers served as buffers in Japan during the crisis periods of 1970s and 
1980s. They argue that women’s relatively higher quit rates than men’s was 
one reason women’s employment faced greater adjustment to changes in 
demand.
Suffice it to say that the relationship between female employment 
and economic recessions is ambiguous at best. If  women’s paid labor 
constitutes a flexible and cheap source of labor, akin to Marx’s notion of 
a reserve army (Bruegel, 1979), their participation in paid work is expected 
to rise during periods of economic recession and decrease in times of 
economic expansion – consistent with the substitution hypothesis. On the 
other hand, women’s perceived status, arising from prevalent social and 
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cultural norms, as caregivers first and labor force participants second, may 
play out in terms of employers’ perceptions of women as less worthy of 
employment during times of economic hardship.
Turning to the crude comparisons of men’s and women’s unemployment 
rates in the aftermath of the Great Recession, men’s unemployment rates 
did rise faster than women’s in several countries hit by the recession. This 
pattern provides a simplistic conclusion that the Great Recession may be 
a “man-cession,” an observation many analyses have made (Wall, 2009; 
Sahin, Song and Hobijn, 2010). However, a closer analysis of intra-country 
and intra-group dynamics is essential to understand how gender impacts 
of the recession played out. In this respect, it is crucial to examine to what 
extent the theoretical approaches, presented in this section, are applicable 
to the gender impacts of crises. This is what follows in the next section.
Empirical Studies
Empirical studies on gender-specific effects of the crisis in terms of its 
impact on the productive sphere has provided contradictory results. That 
men were hit harder than women in terms of job losses of the Great 
Recession is not entirely misplaced insofar as we rely on the first-round 
effects of the Great Recession on broader axes of gender. Since the hardest-
hit sectors – manufacturing and construction as well as high-paid financial 
sector branches – were male dominated, gender occupational and sectoral 
segregation does seem to have protected women’s employment relative to 
men’s. Sierminska and Takhtamanova (2011) use the term “man-cession” 
to describe their findings from the experience of the US economy that men 
fared worse than women in the early years of the Great Recession in terms 
of higher job-separation probabilities, lower job-finding probabilities and 
higher unemployment rates relative to women.
If  we look at the experiences of middle-income countries, similar obser-
vations have been cited (Cho and Newhouse, 2013). Cho and Newhouse 
examine 17 middle-income countries and suggest that the negative employ-
ment effects were stronger for men, particularly for youth. They cite two 
main factors for this pattern: first, men’s concentration in the hardest-hit 
industrial sector; second, men’s higher initial rate of employment.
Notwithstanding the broad conclusions forwarded by much of the 
analyses, it is rather simplistic to brand the Great Recession as a “man-
cession,” as the term starkly ignores the heterogeneity in cross-country 
experiences and in within-gender impacts. Grown and Tas (2011) use 
US data to delve into demographics within gender categories and show 
that African-American males and females, Hispanic males and females, 
young females and single women were hit the hardest by the recession. 
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It is important to note that women’s employment situation in the Great 
Recession was relatively worse than that in previous recessions – that 
women’s employment may have become relatively more vulnerable in 
economic downturns. Grown and Tas note that women lost ten times more 
jobs in the Great Recession than in the previous two recessions, while men 
lost about 2.3 times more jobs. The authors argue that simple male–female 
comparisons of unemployment rates yield partial conclusions and mis-
leading policy options as the race/ethnicity and class status of households 
matters in analyzing the burden of the crisis.
Much of the literature on the effects of the Great Recession over-
looks intergroup inequality – an important aspect in understanding 
how dominant groups can shift the costs of recessions to subordinate 
groups. Dymski, Hernandez and Mohanty (2013) and Arestis, Charles 
and Fontana (2013) address this lacuna in two different contexts. Dymski, 
Hernandez and Mohanty (2013) explore interesting race/gender/power 
aspects of the Great Recession in the United States by investigating the 
overinclusion of women and minority groups in subprime mortgage lend-
ing. They argue that historically disproportionately excluded groups were 
granted equal access to mortgage lending. Female-headed households and 
minority households – especially African-American households – were 
disproportionately and predatorily targeted for subprime credit. Racial 
and gender inequalities produce differential social power, which in turn 
is exploited by lenders – an aspect central to the political economy of 
subprime lending and consequently the subprime crisis. On the other 
hand, Arestis, Charles and Fontana (2013) show that, in the case of United 
States, financialization has been neither race nor gender neutral, which 
subsequently corresponded to stratification effects of the Great Recession. 
Testing the gender and race stratification of the US labor markets, as a 
result of the Great Recession, Arestis, Charles and Fontana show that the 
wage premium for individuals working in managerial and financial occupa-
tions for the period 1983–2009 was unequally distributed – men took an 
increasing share of the finance wage premium at the expense of women. 
On average, White and Hispanic men reaped a disproportionate share of 
the finance wage premium. There is more to investigate with regard to how 
social norms create identity preferences that link managerial and financial 
occupations to high earnings, which are in turn linked to the social status 
of the dominant groups.
To shed some light on the unpaid sector, intra-country studies on the 
effects of the crisis show that the crisis exacerbated preexisting gender 
inequalities within households, especially in terms of unequal burden of 
unpaid labor. Losses in household income in times of economic crisis 
lead to adjustments both in the paid and unpaid work hours. As a result, 
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women are often the bearers of unequal burden of increased work time – by 
working longer paid hours to compensate for the loss in household income 
and by increasing unpaid labor to compensate for the fall in household 
goods and services that were previously procured from the market. The 
burden of extra unpaid labor during periods of economic turmoil depends 
particularly on the gender division of labor within the household.3 Kaya 
Bahçe and Memiş (2013) provide an important observation in this regard. 
In order to examine how individual work time in Turkey changed due to 
the 2008–09 crisis, Kaya Bahçe and Memiş use the Turkish time-use survey 
of 2006 and show that a 1 percent increase in their spouse’s unemployment 
risk raises women’s paid and unpaid labor time by 22 minutes per day.4 
This raises the question of whether the gender restructuring of paid and 
unpaid work contributed to women being overworked and men being 
underworked. For example, during the Asian financial crisis, restructuring 
in gender composition of paid work in Philippines created overwork for 
women, as their paid work hours increased along with household produc-
tion, and forced idleness for men due to unemployment (Lim, 2000).
On the other hand, findings with regard to the redistribution of paid 
and unpaid work hours from the United States show that the 2008–09 
recession narrowed the gap in paid and unpaid labor for married men and 
women. Consistent with the added-worker effect, mothers substituted paid 
work for unpaid labor while fathers’ paid work hours and total workload 
reduced and leisure time increased (Berik and Kongar, 2013).
In sum, the overview from this section suggests that although at cross-
country level the Great Recession appeared to be a “man-cession,” in several 
advanced countries insofar as comparisons are drawn from paid work, 
studies on the intra-country, intra-group, and unpaid work reveal that inter-
sectionality played an important role in shaping the burden of the crisis.
GENDER-SPECIFIC EFFECTS OF THE GREAT 
RECESSION IN THE CONTEXT OF FAMILY 
POLICIES: EUROPE VERSUS THE UNITED STATES
Gender impacts of the Great Recession can be organized along three 
foci: first-round effects were prominent in the financial sector, primarily 
influencing the productive sectors; the second-round effects translated 
via their impacts on household adjustment to the economic contraction, 
thereby encompassing the reproductive sector; and the third-round effects 
transpired through consequent austerity measures (crisis-induced budget 
deficits and cuts, and longer-run adjustments) were particularly conspicu-
ous in the reproductive sector (Fukuda-Parr, Heintz and Seguino, 2013).
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In this context, it is inadequate to try to identify the gender impacts 
of the Great Recession in the abstract: the structures underpinning the 
organization of the family – in essence, family policies that shape gender 
regimes – need to be analyzed in relation to the gender impacts of the Great 
Recession. Social reproduction (the family) and production (the economy) 
are not autonomous structures. While the structure of the economy influ-
ences demand-side constraints for women’s paid work, organization of the 
family creates supply-side pressures and constraints concerning women’s 
integration in paid labor (Folbre, 1994, 2008).
This section aims to draw comparisons between the experiences of 
men and women in the Great Recession in the United States and selected 
European countries based on varieties of gender regimes as reflected by 
family policies.5 The approach adopted in this section links the analysis of 
gender-specific effects of the crisis to differences in institutions of family 
models that underwrite the social construction of gender relations, which 
in turn interact with wider social, political, and economic factors. Gender-
specific economic outcomes are embedded in the institutional settings that 
shape differences in vulnerability to the crises and adjustment paths. To 
keep the analysis to a manageable size, this chapter will limit the focus to 
family policies due to its implications for gender relations concerning paid 
and unpaid work.
Thévenon6 (2011) provides a comparative analysis of family-friendly 
policies across OECD countries in terms of three main types of family sup-
port: leave entitlements, cash transfers, and provision of childcare services. 
Thévenon divides European countries into five main categories in terms of 
generosity of family policies. In group 1 are countries that provide limited 
assistance to families on all three types of family support; this includes 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece. Group 2 comprises countries that 
provide short parental leave and target the support to low-income, single-
parent families with preschool children; it includes Austria, Netherlands, 
UK, and USA. In group 3, high financial support is offered but limited sup-
port is given to dual-earner families with children under age 3; countries in 
this group are Germany, France, Norway, and Denmark. Group 4 consists of 
countries that provide long leave but low cash benefits and childcare for chil-
dren under age 3; Hungary falls under this category. Finally, group 5 consists 
of countries that provide continuous, strong support for working parents of 
children under age 3; Finland and Sweden are included in this category. The 
gender regimes as depicted, in part, by the nature of family policies, reflect 
the specificities of the welfare state and the rubrics of family model that are 
closely linked with the extent of women’s integration in paid work.
Two factors concerning the role of  family policies in shaping 
women’s labor supply during and after the crisis may be relevant for our 
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 discussion. On one hand, as family-friendly policies may be conducive 
to an environment of  relatively higher fertility rates (Thévenon, 2011), 
the pre-crisis structure of  family-friendly policies in many European 
countries may have created a resurgence of  traditional family values in 
terms of  concentration of  women in temporary and part-time work – 
since such policies allow combining paid work with unpaid domestic 
labor (Algan and Cahuc, 2003; Karamessini, 2008; Khalil, 2018).7 In 
this regard, discouraged worker effect for women can be expected to be 
stronger in countries with generous family policies as women may retire 
to the reproductive sphere during periods of  economic slack. On the 
other hand, in the aftermath of  the crisis, ensuing austerity measures 
including cutbacks in social provisions concerning childcare support 
programs8 may compel women to enter paid work to make up for the 
lost family income. In this context, the effect of  culture, family policies 
and crises on women’s employment is complex to predict. Nevertheless, 
observations from the post-recession experiences of  OECD countries 
seems to support the latter argument. The share of  male breadwinner 
households declined sharply in favor of  female breadwinner households 
(Bettio et al., 2012). The role of  added-worker effect is particularly 
important in this regard; family-friendly policies can soften the impact 
of  the crisis by shielding the households’ overall well-being and relate to 
a weaker added-worker effect.
Table 4.1 provides a comparison of men’s and women’s pre- and post-
crisis labor force participation (LFP) rates for 15–64-year-olds (percentage 
in same age group) for the groups of countries according to Thévenon’s 
(2011) family-policy categorization. The first point to note is that in many 
countries women’s LFP rates rose from 2007 to 2009 relative to men’s 
rates. From 2007 to 2009, the ratio of male LFP rate and female LFP rate 
declined for a majority of countries; comparing these figures for the period 
2009 to 2016, this decline appears to have persisted throughout the period. 
The decline in this ratio mainly appears to be due to a higher increase in 
women’s LFP rate relative to men’s rate.
Overall, the figures in Table 4.1 appear to refute the buffer hypothesis – 
the claim that women’s paid work increases during bad times and recedes 
during good times does not seem to hold water for the majority of countries 
during the periods covered in the analysis. However, a counterargument 
could be that many countries in Europe are still undergoing second-round 
effects and hence it is too early to make a call concerning women’s employ-
ment behavior. Notwithstanding, if  we look at the case of the USA, where 
effects from the Great Recession have arguably subsided to a significant 
extent, the buffer hypothesis also does not find support from the figures 
shown in Table 4.1. In the case of the USA, contrary to the predictions of 
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the buffer hypothesis, women’s LFP rate remained almost unchanged (69 
percent) from 2007 to 2009; men’s LFP rate, on the other hand, declined 
from 81.7 percent to 80.4 percent.
To look at the question of whether men experienced a stronger hit, Table 
4.2 presents a comparison of unemployment rates for men and women 
before and after the crisis to examine whether men experienced a stronger 
hit relative to women in terms of a spike in unemployment rates.
Several features in Table 4.2 are worthy of attention. First, in terms of 
the immediate effects of the crisis, unemployment figures for men and 
Table 4.1  Men and women’s labor force participation rates (15–64-year-
olds), percentage in same age group
Country 2007 2009 2016
Men Women Ratioa Men Women Ratio Men Women Ratio
Group 1
Poland 70 56.5 1.24 71.8 57.8 1.24 75.7 62 1.22
Portugal 79.2 68.7 1.15 78.2 68.9 1.13 77.2 70.5 1.10
Spain 82.6 62.8 1.57 82 66 1.24 80.5 70.2 1.15
Italy 74.3 50.6 1.51 73.5 51.1 1.44 74.8 55.2 1.36
Greece 78.4 54.8 1.43 78.5 56.5 1.39 76.2 60.4 1.26
Group 2
Austria 80 67.1 1.19 80 68.7 1.16 80.7 71.7 1.13
Netherlands 83.8 70.4 1.19 84.6 72.3 1.19 84.4 75 1.13
UK 83.3 69.8 1.21 83.2 70.2 1.17 83.4 73 1.13
USA 81.7 69.1 1.18 80.4 69 1.19 78.8 67.3 1.14
Group 3
Germany 81.8 69.4 1.18 82.2 70.4 1.17 82.2 73.6 1.12
France 74.7 64.9 1.15 75 65.7 1.08 75.6 67.9 1.11
Iceland 91.6 83.6 1.10 88.4 82 1.06 91.8 86.2 1.06
Norway 81.8 75.9 1.08 81.4 76.5 1.09 80.3 75.9 1.06
Denmark 83.7 76.4 1.10 83.6 76.8 1.23 82.6 77.2 1.07
Group 4
Hungary 68.6 54.9 1.25 67.7 55 1.23 76.9 63.5 1.21
Group 5
Finland 77.4 73.9 1.05 75.8 73.5 1.03 77.9 74.1 1.05
Sweden 81.4 76.8 1.06 81.3 76.4 1.06 83.9 80.2 1.05
Note: a. The ratio is calculated as male LFP rate divided by female LFP rate. 
Source: OECD (2018b).
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women (15–64-years-old) for the year 2009 show that women in group 
1 experienced higher unemployment rates than men compared to other 
groups.
In this group, women’s unemployment rates were much higher than men’s 
unemployment during the pre-crisis period. The crisis of 2008 appears to 
have narrowed the gender gap in unemployment rate whereby men’s unem-
ployment rose disproportionately more than that of women’s, from 2007 to 
2009. On the other hand, all the countries except the Netherlands in group 
2 exhibited higher male unemployment rates relative to the female rate. A 
similar pattern is depicted for groups 3, 4, and 5 where all the countries 
Table 4.2  Unemployment rates for men and women (15–64-year-olds) 
before and after the Great Recession
Country 2007 2009 2016
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Group 1
Poland 9.1 10.4 7.9 8.8 6.2 6.3
Portugal 7 10.1 9.4 10.7 11.5 11.5
Spain 6.5 10.7 17.7 18.2 18.2 21.5
Italy 5 7.9 6.8 9.3 11.1 12.9
Greece 5.3 13 7.1 13.4 19.9 28.3
Group 2
Austria 4.1 4.8 5.8 5.5 5.8 5.9
Netherlands 3.2 4.1 3.7 3.8 5.6 6.5
UK 5.6 5 8.9 6.6 5.1 4.8
US 4.8 4.6 10.5 8.2 5 4.8
Group 3
Germany 8.6 8.9 8.2 7.4 4.5 3.8
France 7.3 8.1 8.7 8.8 10.1 9.6
Iceland 2.3 2.4 8.9 5.8 3.2 3.2
Norway 2.6 2.5 3.7 2.7 5.6 4.1
Denmark 3.5 4.2 6.8 5.4 6 6.8
Group 4
Hungary 7.2 7.8 10.4 9.8 5.2 5.1
Group 5
Finland 6.5 7.3 9.1 7.6 9.2 8.7
Sweden 6 6.5 8.8 8.1 7.5 6.7
Source: OECD (2018a).
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except France – where male unemployment rate rose slightly more than 
female unemployment – had higher male unemployment rates relative to 
the female rate.
Second, the gender gap in unemployment rate was much larger during 
the pre-crisis period for the countries in group 1 (see Italy and Greece’s 
gender gap in unemployment rates for 2007). This situation persisted over 
the crisis and although the immediate effects of the crisis narrowed the 
gender gap in 2009, the gap widened again over the recovery period. For 
most countries in the rest of the four groups, female unemployment rates 
were higher than male unemployment rates over the pre-crisis period. The 
Great Recession narrowed this gap during the crisis and over the period of 
recovery.
Third, for several countries – UK, USA, Germany, Iceland, Hungary – 
recovery in the unemployment rates for 2016 appear to be larger for men 
relative to that of women although men’s unemployment seems to have 
recovered more quickly than women’s. Reductions in male unemployment 
rates appear to be phenomenal in the UK (from 8.9 percent in 2009 to 
5.1 percent in 2016) and the USA (from 10.5 percent in 2009 to 5 percent 
in 2016). For all the countries except Poland in group 1, male and female 
unemployment rates are stubbornly high, which may correspond to ensu-
ing sovereign debt crisis in these countries (see Lane, 2012).
The second-round effects for group 1 countries, especially Greece, Italy, 
and Spain, suggest that women’s unemployment rates have persistently 
remained higher than men’s. In the case of Greece, the gender gap in 
unemployment rate widened from 7.7 in 2007 to 8.4 in 2016. Similarly, 
Netherlands, Denmark and Austria posted relatively higher unemployment 
rates for women than men in 2016, suggesting that women fared worse 
than men from the second-round effects of the crisis. This is consistent 
with the observation that the second-round effects of the Great Recession 
have started echoing in the services sector where women’s employment is 
predominant. In Spain, women’s unemployment rates have consistently 
surpassed men’s. Due to Spain’s rigid two-tiered labor market, employers 
find it cheaper to cut back on temporary employment, retaining full-time 
employees; this practice has been associated with the perennial problem for 
Spanish women’s high unemployment rates (Lahey and Villota, 2013). In 
2011, an ambitious plan was introduced to restructure the two-tiered labor 
market that compelled employers to either retain permanent, full-time 
employees amid falling demand or face large penalties for dismissing them 
in place of temporary workers. However, the figures for 2016 suggest that 
despite the introduction of the new plan, Spanish women’s high unemploy-
ment rate has persisted. In the case of Portugal, job losses due to the crisis 
for men and women were not uniformly distributed throughout the years 
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following the crisis, 2009 being the worst year for men – brought about 
mainly by contraction of the manufacturing and construction sector – and 
2011 the worst year for women – the losses were mainly concentrated in 
agriculture and manufacturing (Ferreira, 2014). In 2011, men and women 
lost almost the same number of jobs; as of 2016, men and women’s unem-
ployment rates were similar at 11.5 percent.
In sum, the label of “man-cession” for the Great Recession does not 
hold water if  we include the second-round effects; two key developments, 
as shown in Table 4.3, point to a counter-trend. First, the second-round 
effects in many European countries that are undergoing sovereign debt 
crisis – especially, Spain, Italy, and Greece – seem to have impacted women 
more than men insofar as relative unemployment rates are compared. 
Second, men’s unemployment rates recede faster than women’s; however, 
there is significant cross-country heterogeneity in these trends.
The extent to which men’s and women’s labor market outcomes varied in 
response to the crisis may also depend on the types of gender regimes that 
shape the dynamics in both the productive and the reproductive spheres. 
One way of looking at these gender regimes would be to examine the gen-
dered nature of their family policies, especially parental leave systems. Due 
to their implications for gender division of labor (in both paid and unpaid 
work), parental leave policies carry substantial gendered impacts on labor 
markets (Folbre, 2001; Hartmann and Rose, 2004).
Parental leave has direct and substantial effects on the supply of 
women’s paid labor, although its overall impact on women’s employment is 
ambiguous. On one hand, paid leave entitlement gives the right to mothers 
to return to their old jobs after giving birth to a child. Additionally, since 
having a job in the first place is the primary qualification for a parental 
leave, paid leave may act as an incentive for women to join paid labor as 
it protects potential mothers against the fear of unemployment and hence 
loss of income during their childbearing and childcare period. On the 
other hand, paid parental leave entitlements may encourage women to 
stay out of the labor force longer than they otherwise would. It may also 
raise the expected cost to employers of employing women of childbearing 
age and discourage them from hiring women9 (Blau and Kahn, 2013), 
and/or encourage employers to restrict women to temporary forms of 
employment – this is particularly relevant in the case of countries where 
employers share the burden of paid leave entitlements along with public 
social security.
Table 4.3 shows paid leave entitlements for mothers and fathers in 
selected OECD countries as of 2016. Countries where employers share 
the burden of paid leave entitlements include Greece, Netherlands, the 
UK, Germany and Denmark. An important point worth mentioning 
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here is that where paid leave entitlements are disproportionately tilted in 
favor of mothers, traditional gender norms and norms concerning gender 
division of labor may deepen. This may be the case for Greece, Italy, and 
Netherlands where total paid leave available for fathers is less than a week. 
Greece (60.4) and Italy (55.2) have lowest female labor force participation 
rates among other countries, as depicted in Table 4.3. In the case of the 
Netherlands, women have relatively higher employment rates but lower 
working hours, as around 75 percent of Dutch women work part-time and 
only a quarter of women express a preference for a full-time job.10
Family policies that aim to address the conflicts between family care 
and labor market participation interact with cultural factors in shaping 
women’s paid and unpaid employment. Such policies have gendered 
implications – that they may reflect and promote traditional ideals of 
care; for instance, parental leave (paid or unpaid) may reinforce the notion 
that it is mothers’ primary responsibility to act as caregivers first and 
labor force participants second (Budig, Misra and Boeckmann, 2012). 
Prolonged leave policies may lead to longer absence of mothers from paid 
employment after childbirth and may, thereby, foster an adoption of the 
male breadwinner model upon reentry (Berghammer, 2014). That is, paid 
parental leave policies have the effect of reinforcing women’s specialization 
in care. To the extent that women’s perceived responsibilities toward family 
care are read by employers as a negative influence on their paid work 
effort, employers may engage in statistical discrimination against women. 
In this context, both family policies and cultural factors mediate the effect 
of crises on men and women’s employment. For instance, in the cases of 
Spain, Italy, and Greece where cultural support for the male breadwinner 
model is high (Algan and Cahuc, 2003; Budig et al., 2012), gender gaps 
in unemployment rates appear substantially higher than other countries 
over the years covered (see Table 4.3). This relates to the findings that the 
employment rate of women is almost double in Anglo-Saxon (USA, UK, 
Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand) and Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) compared to Mediterranean coun-
tries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey) (Algan and Cahuc, 2003).
To summarize, the discussion from this section attempts to develop 
an understanding of the effects of the Great Recession on labor market 
outcomes of men and women along two axes. First, going back to the 
frameworks for the relation between crises and women’s employment, the 
interaction of culture and family policies would mediate the effect of both 
the substitution and segmentation hypotheses and women’s employment 
can be expected to fare better or worse than men’s accordingly. Second, 
both family policies and cultural factors can help explain why men’s 
employment recovers faster than women’s.
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CONCLUSION
Comparative analysis of the gender-specific effects of the Great Recession 
provided in this chapter suggests that the label of “man-cession” for the 
Great Recession does not hold water if  the overall effects of the crisis are 
taken into account. Although men’s employment took the immediate hit 
in terms of relatively higher job losses than women, this effect may have 
reversed in the second-round effects where women’s employment seems to 
have suffered more.
The extent to which men’s and women’s labor market outcomes varied in 
response to the crisis may also depend on the types of gender regimes that 
shape the dynamics in both the productive and the reproductive spheres. 
Gender regimes, partly explained by the gendered nature of family policies, 
especially parental leave systems, have implications for gender division of 
labor – in both paid and unpaid work. Parental leave policies, along with 
cultural factors, exert gendered impacts on labor markets and, therefore, 
can mediate the effect of crises on men and women’s labor market 
outcomes.
NOTES
 1. This is further supported by the observation that female turnover rates tend to be 
comparatively higher than male.
 2. Whitehead (1979) and Elson (1999) emphasize the idea that labor market institutions 
are “bearers of gender” in the sense that employer–employee relation is embedded under 
the rubric of social stereotypes that assign gender roles in terms of “being the boss,” 
“men’s work” and “women’s work.”
 3. Earlier literature on intra-household time allocation assumed that division of paid and 
unpaid labor is exogenously determined (Becker and Murphy, 1992); in contrast, femi-
nist scholars argue that along with other intra-household interactions, time allocation 
is also endogenously determined by factors such as patriarchal relations, social biases, 
ethical principle and so on (Bittman et al., 2003).
 4. The change in women’s unpaid labor was found to be substantially higher in urban 
settings.
 5. The selection of countries is partly based on availability of literature on their experi-
ences in the Great Recession and partly to allow direct comparison with the United 
States in terms of economic development.
 6. Thévenon (2011) provides a comparative analysis – through principal component 
analysis – of  family policies across OECD countries in terms of  three main types 
of  family support: leave entitlements, cash transfers and provision of  (childcare) 
services.
 7. This may correspond with the perceived characteristic of women’s position as caregivers 
first and labor force participants second.
 8. For example, childcare benefits were retrenched in the United Kingdom as well as 
other family-related measures. Germany reduced parental allowance and compensation 
for paid parental leave. Netherlands also experienced cutbacks in childcare benefits 
(Kersbergen, Vis and Hemerijck, 2014).
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 9. Employers may fear erosion of firm-level skills due to the intermittent nature of 
women’s employment during their childbearing and childcaring years.
10. Dutch News (2017), “Dutch women work part-time even in their 20s with no kids,” 
31 January, accessed 17 July 2018 at http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2017/01/
dutch-women-work-part-time-even-in-their-20s-with-no-kids/.
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